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SECURITY INFORMATION

FEB 6 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, DD/P - PLANS AND PROGRAMS COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Paramilitary Plans for Coup d'etat. (s) in Albania

REFERENCES: a) Memo, DD/P - PFC, Subject: BOFIED Planning,
28 January 1953 (TS# 86249)
b) Planning Study - BOFIED, dated 12 January 1953,
prepared by SS Division (TS# 85945)

1. In compliance with reference a) above submitted herewith are paramilitary plans for a coup d'etat in Albania supported multilaterally by US, UK, and Yugoslavia (Annex G), and for action to be taken in the event of a coup instigated unilaterally by Yugoslavia (Annex A).

2. These plans were prepared in the PM Staff on a "crash" basis during the period 29 January - 6 February. The material included in reference b) provided background intelligence but included no suitable plan to meet either of the situations called for by reference a). The fragmentary nature of reference b), and the stringent time limitations made it impracticable to produce required plans by monitoring a rewrite of reference b).

3. In preparing Annex G (plan for multilateral coup), it was assumed that State Department negotiations to establish necessary basic agreements with UK and Yugoslavia could be accomplished during the period 1 April - 1 June 1953. It was estimated that a bare minimum period of 15 months will be required after these basic agreements are reached to carry out necessary extensive preparatory action to achieve a position of adequate readiness to launch the coup. Eighteen months to two years would be a far more desirable preparatory time. Weather conditions in Albania are such that the coup should be executed during the period 1 June - 30 September. Accordingly, in order to execute the coups during the period June - September 1954, basic State Department agreements must be effected not later than 1 June 1953 and preferably by 1 April 1953. The plan in Annex G is written from the viewpoint of a Combined Covert Headquarters established in Yugoslavia immediately upon conclusion of basic agreements and represents the initial outline plan which would be issued by such a headquarters.

4. The plan in

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4. The plan in Annex A represents the initial outline plan which would be issued by CIA headquarters to assure appropriate action in the event of a unilateral Yugoslav coup under the assumed conditions, which are of particular importance. Fundamental to the commitment of CIA assets in the event of a unilateral coup are the following:

a. Action to expand CIA assets in Albania solely in anticipation of a Yugoslav unilateral coup is not warranted. (The plan therefore visualizes utilization of assets in Albania created primarily for other purposes.)

b. Available CIA assets should be committed only if, in the best judgment of DGI, the success of such a coup, if and when initiated, is dependent upon the commitment of US clandestine service assets in support of the coup, and then only in coordination with clandestine services of UK and Yugoslavia. It is considered that commitment under any other conditions would probably result in destruction of US assets without serving any useful purpose.

5. I desire to emphasize that the enclosed plans were prepared under "essential" criteria (assumptions) prescribed in basic directive (reference a). The basic directive also stated that the covering staff study being prepared by your office would cover "major possible ramifications and consequences" of undertaking a coup in Albania. Accordingly, no effort was made in preparing the attached plans to present an over-all estimate of the situation to determine courses of action which should actually be undertaken. I assume your staff study will make this fundamentally important over-all assessment.

6. In this connection, memo from G/SE to DB/P - PPO, subject: "Operations Against Albania," dated 2 February 1953 emphasizes conditions which are entirely different from those assumed in the basic directive. I am inclined to believe that those conditions are more reasonable than the ones used in the preparation of this plan. Further, in view of the extremely sensitive political factors involved and the bigger issues that might be touched off by an inopportune disclosure of our preparations, as compared with the relatively meager gains to the West, I gravely doubt the advisability of undertaking an Albanian coup in accordance with the attached plan (Annex C).

7. With this in mind, the plan in Annex C is submitted as a static plan -- static in the sense that the basic assumed conditions do not exist and required resources are not available, nor can there be created in the foreseeable future. However, in the event that there are material favorable changes in the present outlook, prompt consideration should again be given to the feasibility of the plan in Annex C or a suitable variation.

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JOHN WICKERLING

Chief, Paramilitary Operations

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